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3-PLACE VS. 2-PLACE -EST∗i
ABSTRACT: Superlative sentences with modal modifiers like
possible give rise to the so-called ‘modal superlative reading’ (Lar-
son 2000, Pancheva 2005). The present paper uses this reading
to investigate an open issue in degree constructions: whereas two
different lexical entries have been argued to exist for the compar-
ative morpheme -er (3-place and 2-place), it is not clear whether
two entries are needed for the superlative morpheme -est. The
paper argues that, with 3-place -est, otherwise unmotivated syn-
tactic material would to have to be postulated and that, even with
this material, not all modal superlative examples would be as-
signed correct truth conditions. In contrast, 2-place -est can gen-
erate the modal superlative reading in all the cases, as shown in
Romero (to appear, under review). Modal superlative sentences,
thus, provide evidence that 2-place -est is needed in the grammar.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with superlative predicates accompanied by
certain modal adjectives, like possible, conceivable and imaginable. On
the one hand, we have simple superlative constructions like (1). On
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the other, we have sentences like (2) where the modal adjective simply
modifies a noun N, the result denoting the set of individuals that are N
in some possible / conceivable / imaginable world.
(1) John is the smartest liar.
a. “John is a liar that is smarter than any other (relevant) liar.”
(2) John is a possible / conceivable / imaginable liar.
a. “Possibly / Conceivably / Imaginably, John is a liar.”
The two constructions are combined in (3). Sentence (3) has—
expectedly—a reading that directly results from the combination of the
ones in (1) and (2). This is the regular modifier reading in (3a). But,
interestingly, a further reading has been noted to arise (Corver 1997,
Larson 2000, Pancheva 2005): the so-called ‘modal superlative’ read-
ing, with the (rough) paraphrase “as X as possible” given in (3b). To
better get acquainted with the modal superlative reading, the reader
can resort to the postnominal version in (4), which lacks the regular
modifier reading and only has the modal superlative reading (Larson
2000). To see one truth-conditional difference between the two read-
ings, note that reading (3b) entails that John is a liar in the actual
world whereas (3a) does not.
(3) John is the smartest possible (/ conceivable / imaginable)
liar.
a. Regular modifier reading: “John is possibly a liar and he is
smarter than any other (relevant) individual that is possi-
bly a liar.”
b. Modal superlative reading: “John is as smart a liar as pos-
sible for him/one to be.”
(4) John is the smartest liar possible (/ conceivable / imaginable).
The same holds for the following examples. The simple superlative
sentence (5) can be understood as in (5a). In (6), the modal adjec-
tive possible acts as a modifier of the noun player. When we combine
the two constructions in (7), we obtain the expected regular modi-
fier reading in (7a) and, additionally, the modal superlative reading
in (7b). Again, the reader can refine her intuitions about the latter
reading with the postverbal version in (8), which only has the modal
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superlative reading.
(5) Bob met the tallest player.
a. “Bob met the player that is taller than any other (relevant)
player.”
(6) Bob met a possible player.
a. “Bob met somebody who may possibly be a player.”
(7) Bob interviewed the tallest possible player.
a. Regular modifier reading: “Bob met the individual who
may possibly be a player who is taller than any other (rel-
evant) individual than may possibly be a player.”
b. Modal superlative reading: “Bob met as tall a player as
possible for him/one to meet.”
(8) Bob met the tallest player possible.
The same phenomenon is found with most and fewest. Most and fewest
are analysed as the superlative of many and of few respectively (Hackl
2009). The simple superlative sentences (9) and (10) have the read-
ings in (9a) and (10a) respectively. The insertion of the modal adjec-
tive in principle preserves this reading with an extra modification of
the head noun, as in (11a) and (12a). And the additional modal su-
perlative reading arises, paraphrased in (11b)–(12b). Again, to better
single out this reading, the reader can use the postnomimal versions in
(13)–(14), which only have the modal superlative reading.12
(9) John climbed the most mountains.
a. “John climbed more mountains than anybody else (rele-
vant) did.”
(10) John talked to the fewest guests.
a. “John talked to fewer guests than anybody else (relevant)
did.”
(11) John climbed the most possible mountains.
a. (#) “John climbed more objects that possibly were moun-
tains than anybody else (relevant) did.”




(12) John talked to the fewest possible guests.
a. “John talked to fewer individuals that possibly were guests
than anybody else (relevant) did.”
b. “John talked to as few guests as it was possible for him /
one to talk to.”
(13) John climbed the most mountains possible.
(14) John talked to the fewest guests possible. (modified from
Pancheva 2005)
Two interconnected questions arise:
(A) How does the modal adjective syntactically and seman-
tically combine with the rest of the elements in the sen-
tence to yield the modal superlative reading?3
(B) What can the modal superlative reading teach us about
superlative constructions and degree constructions in gen-
eral?
Previous analyses of the phenomenon tackle question (A). Larson
(2000) and Pancheva (2005) note some important lexical and syntac-
tic restrictions on the modal superlative reading. They mostly focus
on the syntactic derivation and constituency structure of the construc-
tion. Larson (2000) does not tackle the semantic computation, and
Pancheva (2005) treats the string -est possible as one single lexical en-
try, non-decomposable. Romero (2011, to appear) takes the observed
restrictions and, combining insights from the two approaches, develops
a first compositional semantic account of the modal superlative read-
ing, separating the semantic contribution of -est from that of the modal
adjective.
The present paper investigates question (B), and, in doing so, also
reflects on question (A). Its general goal is to place the modal superla-
tive reading in the bigger picture of comparative and superlative con-
structions.4 On the one hand, for the comparative morpheme, it has
been recently argued that we need two lexical entries for -er crosslin-
guistically (Bhatt & Takahashi 2008): 3-place -er in (15) and 2-place -er
in (16). The 3-place -er occurs in phrasal comparatives non-amenable
to a deletion account, e.g. Hindi-Urdu (17). The 2-place -er is used
inter alia for clausal comparatives like (18). That is, (15) and (16) are
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not theoretical variants of each other, but each of them is empirically
motivated.
(15) ¹-er3−placeº = λxe.λP<d,et>.λye. ∃d[P(d)(y) & ¬(P(d)(x))]
(16) ¹-er2−placeº = λQ<d,et>.λP<d,et>. ∃d[P(d) & ¬(Q(d))]
(Heim 2006)
(17) Atif-ne Boman-se zyaadaa kitaabe parh-i Hindi-Urdu
Atif-Erg Boman-than more books.f read-Pfv.FP1
‘Atif read more books than Boman.’ (Bhatt & Takahashi 2008)
(18) John is taller than Mary is.
On the other hand, for superlative constructions, it is not clear
whether we need to distinguish between a 3-place -est and a 2-place
-est. Two such lexical entries, given in (19)-(20), have been defined in
the literature (Heim 1999), but they have been treated as theoretical
alternatives to each other.5 Evidence for 3-place -est arguably comes
from cases like (21), with the overt comparison argument among the
candidates (type <e,t>). The question is: Are there cases where the
2-place lexical entry for -est is empirically needed? This question has,
to my knowledge, not been addressed in the literature.
(19) ¹-est3−placeº = λY<e,t>.λP<d,et>.λxe. ∃d[ P(d)(x) & ∀y∈Y
[y6=x→¬(P(d)(y))] ]
(20) ¹-est2−placeº = λQ<dt,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d[ P(d) & ∀Q∈Q
[Q6=P→¬ (Q(d))] ]
(21) John is the tallest among the candidates.
The concrete (and relatively modest) goal of the present paper is
the following: to use the modal superlative reading to provide evi-
dence that 2-place -est is empirically needed. More specifically, the first
compositional approach given by Romero’s (2011, to appear) was im-
plemented with 2-place -est. The present paper investigates whether
3-place -est could be used instead to derive the correct truth condi-
tions. We will see that, to get close to the intended reading with 3-
place -est, one would need to posit otherwise unmotivated non-overt
material, and that, even with this material, incorrect truth conditions
are derived for some of the cases. The correct results are obtained
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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if we assume 2-place -est instead. The conclusion is that, under the
framework for degree constructions assumed in this paper, 3-place -est
is ill-suited to derive the modal superlative reading, and, thus, that a
2-place lexical entry for -est is needed in the grammar.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
background on the LF approach to degree constructions assumed here,
introducing 3-place -est and 2-place -est as theoretical alternatives to
each other. Section 3, the central part of the paper, carries out several
attempts at deriving the modal superlative reading with 3-place -est.
Section 4 summarizes Romero’s analysis based 2-place -est. Section 5
concludes.
2. BACKGROUND: LF ANALYSIS OF DEGREE CONSTRUCTIONS
2.1. Comparatives: 3-place -er and 2-place -er
Gradable predicates like tall have, besides their individual argument(s)
(type e), a degree argument (type d). They are treated as downward
monotonic. That is, if the height of a given individual x is exactly
170cm, x counts as 170cm tall, as 169cm tall, as 168cm tall, etc.
The comparative morpheme -er combines with the than-clause or
phrase to form a Degree Phrase (DegP), which occupies the degree
argument position of the gradable predicate. DegP can undergo LF
movement to gain sentential scope, leaving behind a trace of type d
(von Stechow 1984, Heim 2000, among many others). (22) illustrates
the LF and compositional semantic derivation of the Hindu-Urdu exam-
ple (17), with a than-phrase and with 3-place -er. More in more books
is treated as the comparative of the gradable adjective many in (22c)
(Hackl 2000):
(22) a. LF of (17): [ Atif [DegP -er [(than) Boman] ] [2 read
SOME t2-many books] ]
b. ¹Bomanº = b
c. ¹manyº = λdd .λxe.|x| ≥ d (Adapted from Hackl
2009)
d. ¹read SOME t2-many booksº = λy. ∃z[books(z)
& |z| ≥g(2) & read(y,z)]
e. ¹2 read SOME t2-many booksº = λd
′.λy. ∃z[books(z) &
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|z| ≥d′ & read(y,z)]
f. ¹Atifº = a
g. ¹-er3-placeº = λxe.λP<d,et>.λye .
∃d[P(d)(y) & ¬(P(d)(x))]
h. ¹[-er (than) Boman] [2 Atif read SOME t2-many books]º
= 1 iff
∃d [∃z[books(z) & |z|≥d & read(a,z)] & ¬∃z[books(z) &
|z| ≥d & read(b,z)] ]
(23) illustrates the LF and semantic derivation when a than-clause
and 2-place -er are involved.
(23) John is taller than Mary is.
a. LF: [DegP -er [(than) 1 Mary is <t1-tall>] ] [ 2 John is
t2-tall ]
b. ¹2 John is t2-tallº = λd
′. tall(j,d′)
c. ¹2 John is t1-tallº = λd
′. tall(m,d′)
d. ¹-er2−placeº = λQ<d,t>.λP<d,t>.
∃d [P(d) &¬(Q(d))]
e. ¹[-er [(than) 1 Mary is <t1-tall>] ] [ 2 John is t2-tall]º
= 1 iff
∃d[tall(j,d) &¬tall(m,d)]
Note, however, that some languages have a definite free relative as
the complement of than (Pancheva 2006, Romero 2011). This is ex-
emplified in (24). The definite free relative refers to the maximal de-
gree (or to the maximally informative degree) of which the descriptive
content of the relative clause holds. But ¹-er2−placeº expects a set of
degrees (<d,t>), not a single degree (type d), as the comparison class.
Thus, before it can combine with ¹-er2−placeº, the degree referred to
by the free relative has to be converted into the appropriate set of de-
grees. This job is carried out by the function in (25), which Romero
(2011, to appear) treats as the type-shifter SHIFT≤d→<d,t> when no
overt element is directly responsible for the conversion.7 The semantic
computation of (24) is spelled out in (26).
(24) Juan es más alto de [F reeRC lo que lo es María]. Spanish
John is more tall of [F reeRC the thatREL−PRON it is Mary]
‘John is taller than Mary is.’
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Modal Superlatives 8
(25) SHIFT≤d→<d,t> = ¹of
≤ / than≤º = λd′′.λd′. d′ ≤ d′′
(26) Juan es más alto de [F reeRC lo que lo es María].
John is more tall of [F reeRC the thatREL−PRON it is Mary]
a. LF: [DegP -er [(of) the 1 Mary is <t1-tall>] ] [ 2 John is
t2-tall ]
b. ¹2 John is t2-tallº = λd
′. tall(j,d′)
c. ¹1 Mary is t1-tallº = λd
′. tall(m,d′)
d. ¹the 1 Mary is t1-tallº = MAXINF ( d
′.tall(m,d′))
e. ¹ofº = SHIFT≤d→<d,t> = λd
′′. λd′′′.≤d′′′ d′′
f. ¹(of) the 1 Mary is t1-tallº= λd
′′′. d′′′ MAXINF(λd
′.tall(m,d′))
g. ¹-er2-placeº = λQ<d,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d [P(d) & ¬(Q(d))]
h. ¹[-er [(than) 1 Mary is <t1-tall>] ] [ 2 John is t2-tall ]º
= 1 iff
∃d [ tall(j,d) & ¬(d ≤ MAXINF(λd
′.tall(m,d′))) ]
2.2. The scope of LITTLE
It has been noted that sentences with a less comparative are ambiguous
between a maximal boundary reading and a minimal boundary reading
(Seuren 1973, Rullmann 1995). This ambiguity is exemplified in (27):
(27) Lucinda was driving less fast than is allowed on this highway.
(Rullmann 1995)
a. Maximal boundary reading: “She drove below the maxi-
mal speed limit”.
b. Minimal boundary reading: “She drove below the mini-
mum speed limit”.
Heim (2006), following Rullmann (1995), decomposes less into
the comparative morpheme -er and an element little, which basically
amounts to negation. The ambiguity in (27) is derived by allowing
little to have different scoping possibilities with respect to the modal
verb in the than-clause. When little scopes over the modal, the maxi-
mal boundary reading is obtained, as in (28). When little scopes under
the modal, the minimal boundary reading is generated, as in (29).
(28) Maximal boundary reading: “Lucinda drives below the maxi-
mum speed limit”
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a. LF: [ [-er (than) 4 [[t4 LITTLE] 3[allowed Lucinda drive
t3-fast]] ] 2[[t2 LITTLE] 1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]] ]
b. ¹1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]]º = λd
′. Lu drives d′-fast
c. ¹LITTLEº = λdd .λP<d,et>.¬P(d)
d. ¹[[t2 LITTLE] 1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]]º = 1 iff = ¬(Lu
drives g(2)-fast)
e. ¹2 [[t2 LITTLE] 1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]]º = λd
′. ¬(Lu
drives d′-fast)
f. ¹4 [[t4 LITTLE] 3[allowed Lucinda drives t3-fas]]º = λd
′.
¬◊(Lu drives d′-fast)
g. ¹-erº = λQ<d,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d [P(d) & ¬(Q(d))]
h. ¹(28a)º = 1 iff ∃d [¬(Lu drives d-fast) & ◊(Lu
drives d-fast)]
(29) Minimum boundary reading: ”Lucinda drives below the mini-
mum speed limit”
a. LF: [ [-er (than) 4[allowed [[t4 LITTLE] 3[Lucinda drive
t3-fast]]] ] 2[[t2 LITTLE] 1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]] ]
b. ¹2[[t2 LITTLE] 1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]]º = λd
′.
¬(Lu drives d′-fast)
c. ¹4[allowed [[t4 LITTLE] 3[Lucinda drives t3-fast]]]º =
λd′. ◊¬(Lu drives d′-fast)
d. ¹-erº = λQ<d,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d [P(d) & ¬(Q(d))]
e. ¹(29a)º = 1 iff ∃d [¬(Lu drives d-fast) & ¬◊¬(Lu
drives d-fast)]
= 1 iff ∃d [¬(Lu drives d-fast) & (Lu drives d-fast)]
Note that, in languages that use a definite free relative clause in the
than-phrase, we will need to do some type adjustment again. Con-






























This time, instead of the operation in (25) mapping each degree d”
into the set of degrees lower or equal to it, we will need the operation
in (31), which maps each degree d” into the sets of degrees higher or
equal to it.
(31) SHIFT≥d→<d,t> = ¹of
≥ / than≥ º = λd′′. d′. d′ ≥d′′
To see why we need (31), consider e.g. the semantic derivation of
the minimum boundary reading of (30), spelled out in (32). We have
the property of degrees in (32c). In a scenario where the minimum
speed required is 100km/h, (32c) is the characteristic function of the
set {101km/h, 102km/h, 103km/h, 104km/h, . . . }, which goes up to
infinitum. Then we have to compute the contribution of the definite ar-
ticle. Rather than picking the maximal of these degrees (which would
be undefined), the definite article should pick the most informative de-
gree of which its sister property P holds, that is, the degree d such that
P(d)=1 and, for any other d’ such that P(d’)=1, P(d) entails P(d’) (cf.
Beck & Rullmann (1996) for maximal informativity in questions). In
our scenario, this gives us the degree 101km/h as the value of (32e)
(since being allowed not to have 101km/h among your degrees of fast-
ness entails being allowed not to have 102km/h among your degrees
of fastness, and so on). Now, before the comparative morpheme -er
can apply, we have to switch the degree 101km/h into a set of de-
grees, namely into the same set of degrees (29c) that we had obtained
for the same reading of the English counterpart. In our scenario, this
is the set {101km/h, 102km/h, 103km/h, 104km/h, . . . }again, that
is, the set of degrees of speed that one is allowed not to have. This
means that we should not use the lower-or-equal shifting operation in
(25), which would map the degree 101km/h to the set {. . . , 98km/h,
99km/h, 100km/h, 101km/h}. Instead, we need to use the higher-or-
equal shifting operation in (31), which maps 101km/h into the desired
set 101km/h, 102km/h, 103km/h, 104km/h, . . . }.8
(32) Minimum boundary reading: “Lucinda drives below the mini-
mum speed limit”
a. LF: [ [-er than/of the 4[allowed [[t4 LITTLE] 3[Lucinda
drive t3-fast]]] ] 2[[t2 LITTLE]
1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]] ]
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b. ¹2[[t2 LITTLE] 1[Lucinda drives t1-fast]]º = λd
′.¬(Lu
drives d′-fast)
c. ¹4[allowed [[t4 LITTLE] 3[Lucinda drives t3-fast]]]º =
λd′.◊¬(Lu drives d′-fast)
d. ¹theº = λP<d,t>. MAXINF(P)
e. ¹the 4[allowed [[t4 LITTLE] 3[Lucinda drives t3-fast]]]º=
MAXINF(λd
′.◊¬(Lu drives d′-fast))
f. ¹of≥ / than≥ º = SHIFT≥d→<d,t> = λ
′′. d′′′.λd′′′ ≥d′′
g. ¹of/than the 4[allowed [[t4 LITTLE] 3[Lucinda drives t3-
fast]]]º = λd′′′. d′′′ ≥MAXINF(λd
′.◊¬(Lu drives d′-fast))
h. ¹-erº = λQ<d,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d [P(d) &¬(Q(d))]
i. ¹(32a)º
= 1 iff ∃d [¬(Lu drives d-fast) & ¬(d≥MAXINF(λd
′.◊¬(Lu
drives d′-fast)))]
= 1 iff ∃d [¬(Lu drives d-fast) & d<MAXINF(λd
′.◊¬(Lu
drives d′-fast))]
LITTLE and its scope will become relevant later for modal superlative
examples involving fewest possible.
2.3. The Absolute / Relative Ambiguity in Superlatives: 3-place -est and
2-place -est
We move now to superlative constructions. A well-known ambiguity
is found in superlative sentences with a covert comparison class argu-
ment C (Szabolcsi 1986, Heim 1985, 1999). Consider sentence (33),
ignoring intonation for a moment. Under the so-called ‘absolute’ read-
ing, (33) compares mountains in terms of their heights and asserts
something of the highest one, yielding the paraphrase in (33a). Un-
der the so-called ‘relative’ reading, mountain-climbers are compared
in terms of their climbing achievements, and the sentence is para-
phrasable as (33b). Heim’s example (34) displays the same ambiguity,
each of the answers in (34a,b) corresponding to one of the readings:
(33) John climbed the highest mountain.
a. ABSOLUTE reading: “John climbed a mountain higher than
any other (relevant) mountain”.
b. RELATIVE reading: “John climbed a higher mountain than
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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anybody else (relevant) climbed”.
(34) Who wrote the largest prime number on the blackboard?(Heim
1999)
a. Nobody, of course! There is no largest prime number!
Absolute reading
b. John did. He was the only one above 100. Relative
reading
Furthermore, the type of comparison carried out in the relative
reading depends on the focus structure of the sentence. The place-
ment of focus shapes the comparison class. To see this, consider the
examples in (35), where two different relative readings arise correlat-
ing with focus: (35a) compares recipients of John’s letters (in terms of
the lengths of the letters they received from John), whereas (35b) com-
pares senders of letters to Mary (in terms of the lengths of the letters
they sent to Mary).9
(35) a. John wrote the longest letter to MARY.
b. JOHN wrote the longest letter to Mary.
Heim (1999), building on Heim (1985) and Szabolcsi (1986), de-
velops two LF-based accounts of this ambiguity, one using 3-place -est
and one using 2-place -est. In both cases, the main idea is that the
Degree Phrase [-est C] can undergo LF movement out of its host NP,
leaving behind a trace of type d. The LF position of [-est C] then deter-
mines the range of possible choices for the contextual comparison class
¹Cº, which in turn (partly) determines whether we obtain the absolute
or the relative reading.10 We will present each account in turn.
2.3.1. Analysis of the Absolute / Relative Ambiguity using 3-place -est
Heim’s (1999) lexical entry for 3-place -est including presuppositions
is given in (36):
(36) 3-place lexical entry and presuppositions:
¹-estº = λY<e,t>.λP<d,et>.λxe. ∃d [ P(d)(x)
& ∀y∈Y [y6=x→¬(P(d)(y))] ] (=(19))
Presuppositions:
(a) the third argument, x, is a member of the comparison class,
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Y.
(b) all members of the comparison class Y have the property
P to some degree.
The ABSOLUTE reading is derived by scoping the DegP [-est C] within
its host NP, as in (37). The LF sister of [-est C] is the constituent
[1 t1-high mountain], which expresses a <d,<e,t>>-property relating
mountains to their degrees of height. Note that the presupposition
(36b) requires that all members of the comparison class ¹Cº -written
as the set C in the formulas- have the sister property to some degree.
This boils down to requiring that C be a set of mountains. If C equals
e.g. {z: z is a mountain on earth}, the absolute reading obtains with
the highest mountain referring to Mount Everest.11
(37) John climbed the highest mountain.
The RELATIVE reading arises from scoping [-est C] outside its host
NP and adjoining it under the term to be compared, as in (38). Now
the sister constituent, [1 climbed A t1-high mountain], expresses a
<d,<e,t>>-property relating mountain climbers to their achievements
in terms of heights of mountains climbed. Thus, by the presupposition
in (36b), all members of the comparison class C are mountain climbers
that have climbed some mountain of some height. The result is com-
parison among mountain climbers.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(38) John climbed the highest mountain.
(38) is Heim’s (1999) analysis of the relative reading with 3-place
-est, disregarding focus (Heim 1999:§6). Szabolsci’s (1986:§2) idea
is similar, except that she factors focus into the account: the term to
be compared in the relative reading (MARY in (35a), JOHN in (35b)
and focused John in (38)) bears focus and undergoes focus move-
ment.12 With this focus, 3-place -est can be regarded as a schönfinke-
lized version of the GB-style structured meaning approach to focus sen-
sitivity (Jacobs 1983, von Stechow 1990; see also Krifka 2006), where
focus sensitive particles combine with the elements of a triple like (39).
For the relative reading of the sentence JOHN climbed the highest moun-
tain, the triple needed is (40). The syntactic tree needed with focus
movement of JOHN looks like (41) (cf. Heim (1999:(42)). Note that
one needs to allow for the moved DegP to land between the focus-
moved subject JOHN and its movement index 1. With this assumption,
the tree provides the three elements of the desired triple, one at a time.
(39) <F, C, R>, where F is the meaning of the focused element, C
is the comparison class or set of alternatives to F, and R is the
background relation.
(40) <john, C, λd.λx.∃z[mount(z) & high(z,d) & climb(x,z)]>,
where C is resolved to a set of relevant mountain climbers
(due to the presupposition (36b)).
(41) JOHN climbed the highest mountain.
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2.3.2. Analysis of the Absolute / Relative Ambiguity using 2-place -est
Heim’s (1999) 2-place lexical entry for -est is spelled out in (42). As
before, the LF position of [-est C] delimits the range of possible com-
parison classes C. The extra “shaping” of C induced by focus is achieved
via Rooth’s (1985) squiggle operator ∼ in (43): C must be a subset of
the focus semantic value of its sister constituent α.13
(42) ¹-estº = λQ<dt,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d [ P(d) & ∀Q∈Q
[Q6=P→¬(Q(d))] ] (=(20))
(43) ¹α∼ Cº is felicitous only if C is a subset of the focus semantic
value of α.
The RELATIVE reading results when [-est C] moves out of the host
NP and attains sentential scope, as in (44a). Given (43), C must be
constrained so as to fulfill the condition in (44b). The final truth con-
ditions are spelled out in (44c), yielding the relative reading.
(44) JOHN climbed the highest mountain.
a. LF: [ [-est C] [1[JOHNF climbed A t1-high mountain]]
∼ C ]
b. C ⊆ ¹1[JOHNF climbed A t1-high mountain]º
f
C ⊆ { λd′. x climbed a d′-high mountain: x∈De }
C ⊆ { λd′. John climbed a d′-high mountain, λd′.
Bill climbed a d′-high mountain, λd′. Chris
climbed a d′-high mountain, . . . }
c. ∃d [∃z[mount(z) & high(z,d) & climb(j,z)] &




To derive the ABSOLUTE reading within Heim’s (1999) second LF
analysis, an extra assumption is needed: traces and other empty cate-
gories can be focus-marked. This assumption finds empirical support
in examples like (45) and (46), which allow for relative readings simi-
lar to those in (35) except that the focused element would have to be a
trace or PRO (Heim 1999; see also Krifka 1998). With this assumption,
and allowing for a trace t2 of type e within the NP, as in (47a),14 the
comparison class C would be constrained as in (47b). The final truth
conditions in (47c) correspond to the absolute reading.
(45) a. I met the person that John wrote the longest letter to tF .
Cf. (35a)
b. I met the person that tF wrote the longest letter to Mary.
Cf. (35b)
(46) How does one impress Mary?
By PROF writing the longest letter to her. Cf. (35b)
(47) John climbed the highest mountain.
a. LF: John climbed THE 2 [ [-est C] [1[ t2,F t1-high moun-
tain ]]∼C ]
b. C ⊆ ¹1[t2,F t1-high mountain]º
f
C ⊆ { λd′. x is a d′-high mountain: x∈De }
C ⊆ { λd′. Everest is a d′-high mountain, d′.
Kilimanjaro is a d′-high mountain, λd′. Aneto
is a d′-high mountain, . . . }
c. John climbed the unique z: ∃d [ mount(z) & high(z,d) &
∀Q∈C [Q 6=(λd′.z is a d′-high mountain)→¬Q(d)] ]
2.4. Wrapping up
For comparative constructions, we have seen that some comparatives
sentences employ 3-place -er and some others use 2-place -er. Fur-
thermore, for some examples with 2-place -er, some type adjustment is
empirically needed: SHIFT≤d→<d,t> in (25) for positive predicates and
SHIFT≥d→<d,t> in (31) for negatives predicates.
For superlative constructions, the situation with respect to the lexi-
cal entries for -est is different. On the one hand, superlative sentences
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with an explicit comparison class argument, like the ones in (48), pro-
vide evidence that 3-place -est is needed in the grammar (see e.g. Heim
1985 p. 19). The phrases among the candidates and of all my friends
(type <e,t>) are taken to express the comparison class and thus fill up
the λY<e,t> argument of -est in (36).
(48) a. John is the tallest among the candidates. (=(21))
b. Of all my friends, he sang the loudest. (Heim 1985)
On the other hand, superlative sentences without an explicit com-
parison class argument can be analyzed with 3-place -est or with 2-
place -est. Each of the two lexical entries can be used to derive both
the absolute and the relative reading. In fact, with the additional as-
sumptions on each side noted above, the choice between 3-place -est
and 2-place -est basically boils down to the choice between the struc-
tured meaning approach to focus (Jacobs 1983, von Stechow 1990)
and the alternative semantics approach (Rooth 1985 for the relative
reading. The 3-place -est analysis and the 2-place -est analysis are,
thus, theoretical alternatives to each other.
The question to be addressed in this paper is whether the modal
superlative reading can provide any evidence that 2-place -est is needed
in the grammar as well.
We go back now to our modal superlative examples. Section 3
develops three attempts at deriving this reading using the 3-place lex-
ical entry for -est, evaluating the results. Section 4 presents Romero’s
(2011, to appear) proposal, which uses 2-place -est. In both cases,
the modal adjective will not be syntactically parsed as a modifier of
the head noun. Rather, it will form a syntactic constituent with the
superlative morpheme -est, filling up the λC slot of -est (following
Romero (2011)) together with some elliptical material marked as Î
(corresponding to the infinitival complement of possible, as in Larson
(2000)).
3. ATTEMPTS WITH THE 3-PLACE LEXICAL ENTRY -EST
We have seen that, when we insert certain modal adjectives next to a
predicate in the superlative, e.g. highest, most and fewest, we obtain,
besides the expected regular modifier reading, an additional reading:
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the modal superlative reading given in (49a)–(51a).
(49) John climbed the highest possible mountain.
a. Modal superlative reading: “John climbed as high a moun-
tain as it was possible for him to climb.”
(50) John climbed the most possible mountains. (=(11))
a. Modal superlative reading: “John climbed as many moun-
tains as it was possible for him to climb.”
(51) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
a. Modal superlative reading: “John climbed as few moun-
tains as it was possible for him to climb.”
The question to be addressed in this section is whether one can
derive the correct truth-conditions for this reading using Heim’s 3-place
lexical entry for -est, repeated below:
(52) 3-place lexical entry: (=(19))
¹-estº = λY<e,t>.λP<d,et>.λxe. ∃d [P(d)(x) & ∀y∈Y
[y6=x→¬(P(d)(y))]]
I will present in three successive attempts what one would need to
do to get close to the modal superlative reading with 3-place -est. I
will start with a simple syntactic tree (attempt 1), a “straw man” rep-
resentation that fails to derive the reading. To redeem the structure,
the syntactic LF representation will be enriched with considerable non-
overt material (attempt 2). This representation will generate the cor-
rect truth conditions for complex examples with most, but not with few.
This will lead us to modify the scope of LITTLE in the enriched syntactic
structure (attempt 3). The change will bring us closer to the correct
truth conditions of examples with fewest, but not entirely there. The
conclusion will be that, even if we allow for this particular (and other-
wise unwarranted) syntactic enrichment, not all the modal superlative
examples will be assigned correct truth conditions.15
3.1. Scoping 3-place -est inside the host NP
Consider again example (50) with most, repeated below as (53). The
intuition is that the sentence does not compare mountain climbers and
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their achievements, as the relative reading did. Thus, we will start not
with the relative LF but with the absolute LF. That is, we will use the
overt ingredients that we have and build a syntactic structure paral-
lel to that for the absolute reading with 3-place -est in §2.3.1, where
the DegP moves within the host NP. This gives us the tree under (53),
where most is decomposed into many + -est (Hackl 2009).16 The se-
mantic computation is sketched in (54).17
(53) John climbed the most possible mountains.
(54) a. ¹possible Îº = λy. ∃d′[mounts(y) & |y| ≥d′ &
◊climb(j,y)]
b. ¹t1-many mountainsº = λx. mounts(x) & |x| ≥g(1)
c. ¹1 t1-many mountainsº = λd.λx. mounts(x) & |x| ≥d
d. ¹[-est possible Î] t1-many mountainsº =
λx. ∃d [mounts(x) & |x| ≥d & ∀y [ (y6=x & ∃d′[mounts(y)
& |y| ≥d′ & ◊climb(j,y)])→¬|y| ≥d ] ]
e. ¹John climbed SOME [[-est possible Î] t1-many moun-
tains]º = 1 iff
∃x [ climb(j,x) & ∃d [mounts(x) & |x| ≥d & ∀y [ (y6=x &
∃d′[mounts(y) & |y| ≥d′ & ◊climb(j,y)])→¬|y| ≥d ] ] ]
Note that (54e) includes the predication y 6=x over the variables y
and x ranging over mountain sums. Following Hackl (2009), this clause
is interpreted as requiring that the values of x and y do not overlap.
With this in mind, (54e) can be paraphrased as (55):
(55) Paraphrase of (54e):
“Out of the set of mountain-sums y that it is possible for John
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to climb, the cardinality of the sum x that John actually climbed
is greater than the cardinality of any sum y non-overlapping
with x.”
This compares certain mountain sums—the ones that were
allowed—and picks the sum that has the relevant property—being
numerous—to the highest degree. This produces the reading “more
than half of the allowed mountains”, that is, the reading we would ob-
tain if [possible Î] was a regular modifier of mountains. This is not the
modal superlative reading.18
3.2. Adding ingredients for an amount reading
Instead of selecting a mountain sum out of the comparison class of
allowed mountain sums, we need to pick an amount out of the com-
parison class of allowed amounts. That is, we need to generate an
amount reading. This type of reading is exemplified in (56), where the
champagne is understood as “the amount of champagne” (Heim 1987,
Grosu & Landman 1998). Similarly, in its modal superlative reading,
(57) is understood as “John climbed mountains in the largest amount
out of the amounts allowed”.
(56) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they
spilled that evening. (Heim 1987)
(57) John climbed the most possible mountains.
Hence, we have to single an amount out of a comparison class.
Since we are using 3-place -est in (52), we need a property P<d, et >
which the to-be-selected amount xe has to a degree that no other ye in
the comparison class has.19 This property will be expressed by a covert
LF predicate, which I will write as LARGE. The DegP [-est 4 possible Î]
moves out of the d-complement position of LARGE (cf. [-est C] moving
out of the d-complement position of high in (37)). When combined
with its syntactic sister, [-est 4 possible Î] will distill a singleton out of
the comparison class. The unique element in that singleton—namely,
the amount n that has a degree of largeness that no other n’ in the com-
parison class has—is the denotation of DegP∗, i.e., the moved degree
phrase of the gradable predicate many. The resulting tree is given in
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(58):
(58) John climbed the most possible mountains.
Once ellipsis is resolved to the indicated IP, we obtain the LF represen-
tation in (59).20 The crucial steps of the semantic derivation are given
in (60).
(59) LF: [ [A [-est 4 possible < John climbed SOME t4-many moun-
tains >] 2 t2-LARGE] 1 John climbed SOME t1-many moun-
tains ]
(60) a. ¹1 John climbed SOME t1-many mountainsº
= λn. ∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)]
b. ¹4 possible <John climbed SOME t4-many mountains>º
= λn′. ◊∃y [mounts(y) & |y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)]
c. ¹2 t2-LARGEº = λd.λn. large(n,d)
d. ¹-est [4 possible<John climbed SOME t4-many mountains>]
2 t2-LARGEº
= λn. ∃d [large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊∃y[mounts(y) &
|y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)])→¬large(n,d) ] ]
e. ¹(59)º = 1 iff ∃n [ ∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)]
& ∃d [large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊∃y[mounts(y) &
|y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)])→¬large(n,d) ] ] ]
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The final truth conditions can be paraphrased as in (61). This boils
down to the reading “John climbed as many mountains as possible”,
which is the modal superlative reading.
(61) Paraphrase of (60e):
“Out of the amounts such that it is possible for John to climb
that amount of mountains, take the largest one. John climbed
mountains in that amount.”
But what would happen if we applied this analysis to a negative
gradable adjective, e.g. few in (62)?
(62) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
We have seen that most is underlyingly many + -est. Fewest is ana-
lyzed as LITTLE + many + -est (Hackl 2009). The question is, what the
scope of LITTLE should be in the LF tree. In this attempt, we will locate
LITTLE as scoping just above the predicated LARGE, as depicted in (63).
The LF representation after ellipsis resolution is (64). The semantic
derivation is sketched in (65):
(63) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
(64) LF: [ [A [-est 4 possible < John climbed SOME t4-many moun-
tains >] 3[[t3 LITTLE] 2 t2-LARGE]] 1 John climbed SOME
t1-many mountains ]
(65) a. ¹1 John climbed SOME t1-many mountainsº
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= λn. ∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)]
b. ¹4 possible <John climbed SOME t4-many mountains>º
= λn′. ◊∃y [mounts(y) & |y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)]
c. ¹2 t2-LARGEº = λdd .λne. large(n,d)
d. ¹LITTLEº = λd.λP<d,et>.λn.¬P(d)(n)
e. ¹3 [[T3 LITTLE] 2 T2-LARGE]º = λd.λn. ¬large(n,d)
f. ¹-est [4 possible<John climbed SOME t4-many mountains>]
3[[t3 LITTLE] 2 t2-LARGE]º
= λn. ∃d [¬large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊∃y[mounts(y)
& |y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)])→ large(n,d) ] ]
g. ¹(64)º = 1 iff ∃n [∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)]
& ∃d [¬large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊∃y[mounts(y) &
|y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)])→ large(n,d) ] ] ]
The truth conditions in (65e) are decidedly too weak. Regardless
of what the minimum amount of mountains required is, as long as
John climbed at least one mountain, the formula is true. This is so
because the predication introduced by many—as we saw for gradable
predicates in general—is downward monotonic: if |x| ≥7, then it is
also true that |x| ≥6, that |x| ≥5, that |x| ≥4, etc. To see the impact of
this in the present truth conditions, consider a scenario where the rules
of the contest set a minimum amount of mountains to be climbed, e.g.
3, and a maximum amount, e.g. 7. Assume, furthermore, that John
happened to climb exactly 5 mountains. Sentence (62) is intuitively
false in this scenario. However, the truth conditions generated in (65)
are satisfied. The comparison class (65b)—the class of amounts n’ such
that it is permitted to climb a sum of mountains y such that |y| ≥n’—is
the set {n’:1≤n’≤7} (since there is an allowed world where he climbs
e.g. the mountain sum A+B+C, and |A+B+C| ≥1). From this class,
the superlative selects the smallest amount, that is, 1. The formula in
(65e) is true as long as John happened to climb some mountain(-sum)
x such that |x| ≥1.
The reader may wonder what would happen if we suspended the
assumption that many is downward monotonic in this example. Could
we appeal to a pragmatically enriched meaning where many relates its
individual argument x only to its exact cardinality n, as in |x|=n? This




(66) ¹(64)º = 1 iff ∃n [ x [mounts(x) & |x|=n & climb(j,x)] &
∃d [¬large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊∃y[mounts(y) & |y|=n′ &
climb(j,y)])→ large(n,d) ] ] ]
(67) Paraphrase of (66):
“Out of the amounts n′ such that it is possible for John to
climb that amount of mountains, there is a mountain-sum that
John climbed whose cardinality equals the smallest of those
amounts.”
Unfortunately, these modified truth conditions are still too weak.
Consider again the scenario described above, where the minimum re-
quirement is 3 mountains, the maximum is 7 and John happens to
climb exactly 5 mountains. We saw that sentence (62) is judged in-
tuitively false in this scenario, since John climbed more than the min-
imum. But the truth conditions in (66) predict it to be true, due to
distributivity: if John climbed the mountain sum A+B+C+D+E, he
certainly climbed the mountain (sub-)sum A+B+C. Hence, there exists
a mountain-sum (A+B+C) of cardinality 3 climbed by John, that is, a
mountain-sum climbed by John whose cardinality equals the minimum
required.21,22
3.3. Relocating LITTLE
To avoid these riddles, the next and final attempt changes the location
of LITTLE. The treatment of the positive version with most remains the
same, as in (68). But the case with fewest is revised. In attempt 2, we
assumed that LITTLE modifies the LF predicate LARGE, rendering the
paraphrase in (69a). In attempt 3, we will treat LITTLE as a modifier of
many, as the paraphrase in (69b) suggests:
(68) John climbed the most possible mountains.
a. Attempt 2 / 3: “John climbed mountains in the largest
amount out of the amounts allowed”.
(69) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
a. Attempt 2: “John climbed mountains in the smallest amount
out of the amounts allowed”.
b. Attempt 3: “John climbed mountains in the largest lack-
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of-amount out of the lacks-of-amount allowed”.
With this modification, we let LITTLE scope over the matrix IP spine,
crucially out of the host NP [SOME t1-many mountains]. This gives us
the tree in (70):
(70) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
Once ellipsis is resolved, we obtain the LF representation in (71).
The semantic computation is sketched in (72):
(71) LF: [ [A [-est 4 possible < [t4 LITTLE] 5 John climbed SOME
t5-many mountains >] 3 t3-LARGE] [ 2 [t2 LITTLE] 1 John
climbed SOME t1-many mountains ] ]
(72) a. ¹1 John climbed SOME t1-many mountainsº
b. ¹LITTLEº = λn.λP<e,t>.¬P(n)
c. ¹2 [[t2 LITTLE] 1 John climbed SOME t1-many mountains]º
= λn. ¬∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)]
d. ¹4 possible <[t4 LITTLE] 5 John climbed SOME t5-many
mountains>º
= λn′. ◊¬∃y [mounts(y) & |y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)]
e. ¹3 t3-LARGEº = λd.λn. large(n,d)
f. ¹-est [4 possible <[t4 LITTLE] 5 John climbed SOME t5-
many mountains>] 2 t2-LARGEº
= λn. ∃d ∃d [large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊¬∃y[mounts(y)
& |y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)])→¬large(n,d) ] ]
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g. ¹(71)º= 1 iff ∃n [ ¬∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)]
& ∃d [large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊¬∃y[mounts(y) &
|y| ≥n′ & climb(j,y)])→¬large(n,d) ] ] ]
(73) Paraphrase of (72e):
“Out of the amounts n’ such that it is permitted to fail to climb
n’-many mountains, take the largest one. John failed to climb
mountains in that amount.”
To see what (72e)/(73) commits us to, consider a scenario where
the rules of the contest just set a minimum amount of mountains to
be climbed, let us say 10. The comparison class—the set of amounts
n′ such that it is permitted to fail to climb n′-many mountains—is thus
{n′: 10 < n′}. Then we have to select the largest amount in that set.
But this is not possible, since the set goes up to infinitum, i.e., it is
unbounded on the upper side. This means that, regardless of how
many mountains John climbed in actuality, the sentence is predicted
to yield a presupposition failure in this scenario. This is contrary to
intuitions.
What we would need in order to derive the correct truth condi-
tions for examples with fewest is to select not the largest amount in
the comparison class, but the smallest. In other words, we would need
the truth conditions in (74) and the correponding paraphrase in (75).
This would give us the modal superlative reading “John climbed as few
mountains as possible”.
(74) ¹(70)º = 1 iff ∃n [¬∃x [mounts(x) & |x| ≥n & climb(j,x)] &
∃d [¬large(n,d) & ∀n′ [ (n′ 6=n & ◊¬∃y[mounts(y) & |y| ≥n′
& climb(j,y)])→ large(n,d) ] ] ]
(75) Paraphrase of (74):
“Out of the amounts n′ such that it is permitted to fail to climb
n’-many mountains, take the smallest one. John failed to climb
mountains in that amount.”
Could we justify this change and thus derive the desired truth con-
ditions? I do not see a way to successfully implement this move while
preserving the correct results for other degree constructions in general
and for other modal superlative examples in particular. Here I will
briefly sketch two avenues, both unsatisfactory.
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
27 Maribel Romero
A first try would be to assume that, in the modal superlative ex-
amples, fewest actually involves two occurrences of LITTLE. Note that,
in the desired paraphrase (75), there are semantically two negations:
one corresponding to “fail” and one corresponding to “small”, i.e.,
“LITTLE/not large”. Then, one occurrence of LITTLE would scope over
the matrix IP spine, as in the current attempt 3, and give us the pred-
ication with “fail” in the semantic paraphrase. The other occurrence
would negate LARGE, as in attempt 2, and give us the predicate “small”
in the semantic paraphrase. However, under this approach, it would be
completely obscure why negative predicates involve one instance of LIT-
TLE in other degree constructions (e.g. in less comparatives in §2.2) but
two in modal superlative cases.
A second try would be to have, instead of the covert predicate
LARGE, something vague, a predicate that sometimes compares the
amounts in the comparison class in terms of their largeness, as in
(60e)–(61), and sometimes in terms of their smallness, as in (74)–
(75). The problem here is that it is totally unclear what would ensure
that the correct property is chosen. In the case of (70) with fewest, we
could perhaps justify the right choice in the following way. Resolving
the vague predicate to the property “large” automatically yields a pre-
supposition failure, whereas resolving it to the property “small” does
not. Since speakers are cooperative, they try to avoid presupposition
failures in production and comprehension. Hence, resolution to “large”
will be dismissed in favor of resolution to “small”. But now consider
example (58) with most. Here we would also have a vague predicate
to be resolved to the property “large” or to the property “small”. If
we chose “large”, the correct truth conditions are derived. But, as the
reader can check for herself, if we choose “small”, we end up with
the problematic weak truth conditions in (66)–(67) that we discussed
in §3.2. This is certainly not a possible reading of the sentence John
climbed the most possible mountains.
To recapitulate, the modal superlative reading intuitively involves
an amount reading where possible degrees or amounts (of height, of
cardinality, etc.) are being compared. Since we are using the 3-place
lexical entry for -est, repeated below, we need to set up: (i) a compari-
son class of degrees or amounts (for the λY<e,t> slot); (ii) the “winning”
degree or amount (for the λxe slot); and (iii) a property to measure the
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competing degrees or amounts of type e using degrees of type d (for
the λP<d,et> slot). Basically, the 3-place lexical entry forces us to ar-
tificially use degrees in two different ways (as the measured objects
and as the measuring units) and to come up with a covert measuring
predicate in the syntactic tree whose varying content causes problems.
(76) 3-place lexical entry: (=(19))
¹-estº = λY<e,t>.λP<d, et >.λxe. ∃d [P(d)(x) & ∀y∈Y
[y6=x→¬(P(d)(y))]]
As we will see in §4, the need to use degrees or amounts in two
different ways and to insert a covert syntactic predicate disappears if
we use 2-place -est.
4. ROMERO’S ANALYSIS USING THE 2-PLACE LEXICAL ENTRY -EST
Romero (2011), who develops in detail the analysis sketched in Romero
(to appear), derives the modal superlative reading using Heim’s (1999)
2-place -est in (77). She takes [1 possible ÎAC D] to overtly express the
comparison class argument of -est, thus directly filling up its λQ<dt,t>
slot.
(77) 2-place lexical entry: (=(20))
¹-estº = λQ<dt,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d [ P(d) & ∀Q∈Q
[Q6=P→¬Q(d)] ]
Let us begin with the simple example (78) first. The LF she pro-
poses is below. The Degree Phrase consists of -est plus its comparison
class complement [1 possible ÎAC D], which, following Larson (2000),
is a reduced relative clause (1 possible for him to climb a t1-high moun-
tain) with antecedent-contained IP-deletion (1 possible Î). DegP moves
out of the host NP to gain sentential scope, as in the relative LF in
§2.3.2. Finally, the ACD gap is resolved. This gives us the LF structure
(79), which is fed to semantic interpretation.
(78) John climbed the highest possible mountain.
(79) LF: [-est [1 possible <John climb A t1-high mountain>]] [2
John climbed A t2-high mountain]
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The semantic computation is spelled out in (81). Recall that,
for comparative constructions, we sometimes needed the type-shifter
SHIFT≤d→<d,t> (25) turning a degree point into the set of degrees lower
or equal to it. Parallel to that shifter, a shifter SHIFT≤<d,t>→<d,t> is de-
fined in (80) turning a set of degree points into the set of corresponding
lower-or-equal degree sets. The final truth conditions of the sentence
are given in (81g).





(81) a. ¹2 John climbed A t2-high mountainº =
λd. ∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & high(x,d)]
b. ¹<John climbed A t1-high mountain>º = 1 iff
∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & high(x,g(1))]
c. ¹possible <John climbed A t1-high mountain>º = 1 iff
◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & high(x,g(1))]
d. ¹1 possible <John climbed A t1-high mountain>º =
λd. ◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & high(x,d)]





f. SHIFT≤<d,t>→<dt,t> (¹1 possible <John climbed A t1-high
mountain>º)= λD′<d,t>. ∃d
′ [◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x)




g. ¹(80)º = 1 iff
λd. ∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & high(x,d)] & ∀D′ (∃d′
[◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & high(x,d) & high(x,d′) &
D′=λd′′.d′′ ≤d′ & D′ 6= λd′′′.∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) &
high(x,d′′′)])→¬D′(d)]]
To show more intuitively what the computation says, Romero
(2011) considers a scenario where John is allowed to climb mountains
that are 3000m high or less, but no higher than that. The set of allowed
degree sets will be {λd′′.d′′ ≤1m, λd′′.d′′ ≤2m, . . . , λd′′.d′′ ≤1000m,
. . . , λd′′.d′′ ≤2000m, . . . , λd′′.d′′ ≤3000m}. This is the comparison
class in (81f). Now consider the set corresponding to the maximal
mountain-height that John climbed in the actual world. This is John’s
actual set in (81a). The sentence asserts that John’s actual set con-
tains a degree point that no other set in the comparison class contains.
Hence, John climbed as high a mountain as possible (or allowed).23
Romero (2011) further shows how complex examples with most
and fewest can be treated in a parallel way. Let us see each case in
turn.
In example (82) with most, after the DegP moves out of the host
NP to the top of the clause and ACD is resolved, we have the LF (83)
and the abridged semantic derivation in (84).
(82) John climbed the most possible mountains.
(83) LF: [-est [1 possible <John climbed t1-many mountains>]] [2
John climbed t2-many mountains]
(84) a. ¹2 John climbed t2-many mountainsº= λd. ∃x [mount(x)
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& climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d]
b. ¹1 possible <John climbed t1-many mountains>º = λd.
◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d]





d. SHIFT≤<d,t>→<dt,t> (¹1 possible <John climbed t1-many
mountains>º) =
λD′<d,t> ∃d
′ [ ◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d] &
D′=λd′′.d′′ ≤d′]
e. ¹(83)º = 1 iff
∃d [ (∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d] &
∀D′ [ ∃d′ [◊∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d] &
D′=λd′′.d′′ ≤d′] &
D′ 6= λd.∃x [mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d])→¬D′(d)]
]
The result is that the sentence asserts that the set of mountain-
amounts (84a) that John actually climbed contains a degree that no
other allowed set in the comparison class (84d) contains. Hence, John
climbed as many mountains as possible (/as he was allowed to).
For example (85) with fewest, we add LITTLE and give it sentential
scope. Once the ellipsis is resolved, we obtain the LF in (86):
(85) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
(86) [-est [3 possible <[t3 LITTLE] 1 John climbed t1-many




The semantic computation is given under (88). Recall that, for less
comparatives, we sometimes needed the shifting operation (31) turn-
ing a degree into the set of degrees higher or equal to it. We define its
sister operation for superlatives in (87): we map a set of degrees into
the set of the corresponding higher-or-equal degree sets. The rest of
the computation proceeds as before. As a result, the sentence asserts
that John’s actual set of unclimbed mountain- amounts contains a de-
gree that no other allowed set of unclimbed mountain-amounts in the
comparison class contains. Hence, the total amount of mountains John
climbed is as low as possible/permitted. That is, John climbed as few
mountains as possible.





(88) a. ¹LITTLEº = λdd .λP<d,t>.¬P(d)
b. ¹2 John climbed t2-many mountainsº = λd. ∃x[mount(x)
& climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d]
c. ¹4 [t4 LITTLE] 2 John climbed t2-many mountainsº = λd.
¬∃x[mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d]
d. ¹3 possible <[t3 LITTLE] 1 John climbed t1-many moun-
tains>º = λd′. ◊¬∃x[mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d′]





f. SHIFT≥<d,t>→<dt,t> (¹3 possible<[t3 LITTLE] 1 John climbed
t1-many mountains>º) =
λD′<d,t>. ∃d
′ [ ◊¬∃x[mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d′] &
D′=λd′′.d′′ ≥d′]
g. ¹(86)º = 1 iff
∃d [¬∃x[mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d] &
∀D′ [ (∃d′[◊¬∃x[mount(x) & climb(j,x) & |x| ≥d′] &
D′=λd′′.d′′ ≥d′] & D′ 6= λd.¬∃x[mount(x) & climb(j,x)
& |x| ≥d])→¬D′(d)] ]
Before concluding this section, an important question remains to
be addressed. A key ingredient of the analysis is the shifting opera-
tions (80) and (87). These are just the shifting operations motivated
for comparatives (see §2.1 and §2.2) adapted now to superlative con-
structions. But, both for comparative and for superlative constructions,
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the question arises, what guarantees the choice of the right shifter—
SHIFT≤ vs. SHIFT≥—in the appropriate configuration. Within the cur-
rent framework, the intuitive answer is this: The correct choice is se-
cured by whatever principle prohibits comparison between cross-polar
degree sets in sentences like (89). Sentence (89) asks us to compare an
upper-bound set of degrees (namely, λd’.tall(carmen,d’)) with a lower-
bound set of degrees (namely, λd’.¬tall(alice,d’)), which renders the
sentence odd. This idea can be implemented by adding a presupposi-
tion to the lexical entries of 2-place -er and 2-place -est to ensure that
the degree sets to be compared are all bound in the same direction. A
way to achieve this effect is formulated in (90) and (91):24
(89) ?Alice is shorter than Carmen is tall. (Kennedy 2001)
(90) ¹-er2−placeº = λQ<d,t>.λP<d,t>: Q⊆P ∨ Q⊇P. ∃d
[P(d) & ¬(Q(d))]
(91) ¹-est2-placeº = λQ<dt,t>.λP<d,t>:∀Q∈Q[Q⊆P ∨ Q⊇P]. ∃d
[ P(d) & ∀Q∈Q [Q6=P→¬(Q(d))] ]
In sum, using Heim’s 2-place lexical entry for -est, one can derive
the modal superlative reading “as X as possible” in simple examples
like (78), as well as in complex examples involving many, like (82)
and (85).
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that superlative sentences with certain modal adjectives
give rise to the so-called modal superlative reading, exemplified with
the core examples in (92)–(94). The present paper has investigated
whether this reading can be derived using the 3-place lexical entry
for -est. We have seen that otherwise unmotivated covert syntactic
material would need to be posited, and that, even with this material,
some complex examples are assigned incorrect truth conditions. In
contrast, the 2-place lexical entry for -est can derive the correct truth
conditions for all the cases at hand, as shown in Romero (2011, to
appear).
(92) John climbed the highest possible mountain.




(93) John climbed the most possible mountains.
a. Modal superlative reading: “John climbed as many moun-
tains as possible”.
(94) John climbed the fewest possible mountains.
a. Modal superlative reading: “John climbed as few moun-
tains as possible”.
In the bigger picture, this brings superlative and comparative mor-
phemes closer. As we saw in §2, two lexical entries for comparative
-er have been recently motivated using crosslinguistic data: 3-place -er
and 2-place -er in (95)–(96). As for superlatives, the 3-place lexical
entry for -est in (97) has been argued for on the basis of examples with
an explicit comparison class argument of type <e,t>. The question re-
mained, whether we needed the 2-place lexical entry for -est in (98)
as well. The present paper has argued that we need 2-place -est in the
grammar.
(95) ¹-er3−placeº = λxe.λP<d,et>.λye. ∃d[P(d)(y) & ¬(P(d)(x))]
(=(15))
(96) ¹-er2−placeº = λQ<d,et>.λP<d,et>. ∃d[P(d) & ¬(Q(d))]
(=(16))
(97) ¹-est3−placeº = λY<e,t>.λP<d,et>.λxe. ∃d[ P(d)(x) & ∀y∈Y
[y6=x→¬(P(d)(y))] ] (=(19))
(98) ¹-est2−placeº = λQ<dt,t>.λP<d,t>. ∃d[ P(d) & ∀Q∈Q
[Q6=P→¬ (Q(d))] ] (=(20))
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Notes
1The attentive reader may have noticed a subtle difference between the simple su-
perlative sentences used so far: (9) and (10) require focus stress on the subject John
while (1) and (5) do not, and the resulting paraphrases differ. (In fact, (5) also has
a paraphrase parallel to (9)–(10) when the subject is focused, as in (i) below.) As we
will see below (§2.3), even simple superlative sentences give rise to different readings,
known as absolute and relative. For the time being, what is important is that, besides
the reading(s) shared with the corresponding simple superlative sentence, modal modi-
fication adds the indicated modal superlative reading.
(i) BOB met the tallest player.
a. “Bob met a taller player than anybody else (relevant) did.”
2Barbara H. Partee (p.c.) points out to me that (11)–(12) seem slightly odd on the
modal superlative reading and that the postnominal versions are preferred. I do not
have an explanation for this preference. Although the alternative analyses to be dis-
cussed in this paper will be illustrated for the prenominal versions, they are aimed at the
postnominal versions as well, modulo overt syntactic movement of the possible phrase.
3We are mostly interested in the part of the modal superlative reading correspond-
ing to the paraphrase “as X as possible”. The following two further aspects will not be
addressed. First, we leave open whether the correct paraphrase corresponds to the struc-
ture [possible for PROARB to buy], with a generic PROARB , or to the structure [possible for
himi to buy], with a pronoun coindexed with the matrix subject. A possible way to dis-
tinguish between the two, suggested to me by Barbara H. Partee (p.c.), is the following.
If the implicit restrictor in (i) corresponds to a generic PROARB , then the host and I must
have talked to the same number of guests. But, if the implicit restrictor in (i) corresponds
to a coindexed pronoun, a sloppy reading where the host and I talked to a different num-
ber of guests should be available (since it is likely that the host’s minimum is higher).
(i) I talked to the fewest possible guests, and so did the host.
My judgement is that a sloppy reading is available in (i), arguing that the coindexed
pronoun reading is at least possible. See Larson (2000:§3.4) for an argument that the
generic PROARB interpretation is not possible (though he aknowledges that judgements
are subtle). See also endnote 20 below. Second, we will not investigate the range and
distribution of potential modal bases for the modal adjectives. Though metaphysical
possibility is often conveyed, deontic possibility also seems to be available in some ex-
amples (understanding possible as “allowed”, e.g. in (11b), (12b), (13) and (14)). We
will simply choose one modal base when illustrating alternative analyses.
4Thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) for pointing out the relevance of the comparative data.
5See discussion in §2.3 and §2.4.
6The framework assumed in this paper treats degrees as points on a scale (von Ste-
chow 1984, among many others), derives certain readings from different scoping pos-
sibilities at LF (Heim 1985, 1999), and decomposes negative adjectives like short as
“not tall” (Heim 2006). Alternative views exist that treat degrees as intervals (e.g.
Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002), that derive certain readings in situ (Sharvit & Stat-
eva 2002) and that analyze antonyms as involving two different sorts of degrees (e.g.
Kennedy 2001). The analysis of the modal superlative reading in these alternative frame-
works is beyond the scope of this paper.
7This type conversion is sometimes carried out by an overt element and sometimes
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by a covert element or a type-shifter. Cases with an overt element are e.g. niż ‘than’
in Polish niż-comparatives (Pancheva 2006) and de ‘of’ in Spanish (24). Cases with a
covert element are e.g. Russian čem ‘wh-’ comparatives and Polish jak ‘wh-’ comparatives
(Pancheva 2006).
8Romero (2011) raises the possibility of integrating the two operations SHIFT≤d→<d,t>
in (25) and SHIFT≥d→<d,t> in (31) into one single SHIFTd→<d,t> based on informativity,
but leaves it open for future research.
9Focus seems to be necessary for the relative reading to arise. In discussing the
two relative readings of (i), Heim (1985) notes that “apparently, the correlate is always
marked by focus, so that the sentence is actually never ambiguous in spoken language”
(p. 20). Szabolcsi (1986) notes that in Hungarian, where focused phrases not only re-
ceive pitch accent but are also moved to preverbal position, focus accent and movement
are a necessary condition for the relative reading (p. 246ff). She also discusses English,
with no focus movement and where the pitch accent may not always be salient, and ar-
gues for the same conclusion (pp. 4ff).
(i) Of these three men, John hates Bill the most.
10Both alternatives assume that the is semantically vacuous, with an abstract THE or
A / SOME instead.
11The semantic derivation in (37) also allows for the relative reading. See Heim
(1999), Sharvit & Stateva (2002) and Büring (2007) among others for extensive dis-
cussion.
12In fact, in Szabolsci’s analysis, what is crucial for the relative reading is that the term
to be compared undergoes movement, because it is in focus or because it is a wh-word.
This will subsume the examples (45) below with a relative pronoun, but not example
(46) with PRO.
13The recursive definition of focus semantic value ¹.º f based on the ordinary semantic
value ¹.ºo is spelled out in (i) (Rooth 1985):
(i) Focus semantic value ¹.º f : a. If α is a terminal node, then ¹αº f = {¹αºo}.
b. If α is a non-branching node with single daughter β , then ¹αº f = ¹βº f .
c. If α is a branching node with daughters β and F (Focus feature), then ¹αº f = Dσ,
where σ is the type of ¹βºo .
d. If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ (order irrelevant), and there are
types σ and τ such that ¹αºo ∈ D<σ,τ> and ¹γº
o ∈ Dσ,
then ¹αº f = {x∈Dτ: ∃y∃z [ y∈ ¹βº f & z∈¹γº f & x=y(z) ] }
14Heim (1999) does not spell out absolute LFs with 2-place -est. (47a) is Romero’s (to
appear) implementation of her ideas. The required trace t2 could be obtained by positing
an N’-internal PRO that moves and then deletes (see Heim & Kratzer (1998) on PRO, von
Stechow (to appear) on a similar use of PRO for tense).
15The trees in attempts 1-3 retain the idea from Romero (to appear) that [possible Î]
is the explicit complement of -est. But the same results would obtain in attempts 2 and
3 if -est took a contextual variable C as its complement while [possible Î] was the sister
of [Deg′ t LARGE] to the right.
16In the LF trees in §3 and §4, the direct object [SOME X-est possible mountains] is left
in situ for perspicuity, rather than QRed.
17For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the ellipsis in [possible Î] can be
resolved so that something like (54a) obtains.
18Note that attempt 1 also fails for simple examples like (i). The type of structure in
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attempt 1 would derive the reading “John climbed the highest of the mountains which
he was (de re) allowed to climb” (mountains as de re), rather than the modal superlative
reading “John climbed as high a mountain as he was allowed to” (mountains as de dicto,
amounts of mountains as de re).
(i) John climbed the highest possible mountain.
19For readability, I will treat amounts as a particular sort of individuals (type e), keep-
ing the types C<e,t>, P<d,et> and xe as they are in the lexical entry (52) and using the
variables n, n’ to range over indivuals of the sort amount. This is not crucial for the
analysis. One could have taken amounts to be of type d, and then rewrite (52) with the
types C<d,t>, P<d,dt> and xd .
20The LFs with the ellipsis site resolved to the matrix IP∗ as it is correspond to the para-
phrase “. . . as it was possible for him to climb”. If we wanted to generate the paraphrase
“. . . as it was possible for one to climb”, we would have to allow for ‘vehicle change’ be-
tween a proper name and PRO, in the sense of Fiengo & May (1994). Note that instances
of vehicle change between proper names and other empty categories—e.g. a trace—are
attested, as exemplified in (i):
(i) John kissed Mary, but I wonder who Harry did kiss t.
(Fiengo & May 1994:219, attributed to Wyngaerd-Zwart)
21This type of problem is sometimes referred to as ‘van Benthem’s problem’. See e.g.
Hackl (2000) on this problem in comparatives.
22In fact, distributivity also has an impact on the comparison class. That is, even if we
re-write the logical expression in (65b) using |y|=n’, we end up with the same allowed
set {n’: 1≤n’≤7}. Take an allowed world where John climbs A+B+C, whose cardinality
is 3. In that same world, it is also true that John climbs A, whose cardinality is 1.
Hence, amount 1 is one of the allowed amounts. This means, again, that the final truth
conditions are satisfied as long as John climbed at least one mountain.
23The truth conditions in (81g) equal those that Schwarz’ non-decomposable lexical
entry [-est possible] would derive, namely the “at least as X as possible” reading in (i).
See Romero (2011) for discussion on the “exactly as X as possible” reading in (ii).
(i) “John climbed as high a mountain as possible/allowed and possibly higher.”
(ii) “John climbed as high a mountain as possible/allowed and no higher.”
24See Kennedy (2001) for an approach to cross-polar anomaly within a different frame-
work, where degrees are viewed not as points but as intervals and where two comple-
mentary sorts of degrees—positive and negative—are distinguished.
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